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INTRODUCTION 
The Appellees' Brief attempts to minimize the significance of Judge Thome's 
summary judgment ruling, in which Judge Thome held the covenants in the deed to be 
clear and unambiguous. The Appellees' efforts to minimize the significance of that 
ruling, however, stands in stark contrast to the position they asserted below, and which 
they continue to assert, that Judge Thome's summary judgment ruling was correct. A 
review of the record demonstrates that Judge Thome found the deed restrictions to be 
clear and unambiguous, despite the fact that Judge Thome was not given the opportunity 
to be adequately briefed or to hear evidence on the issue. Thereafter, Judge Dever inap-
propriately relied on the "law of the case" doctrine in refusing to appropriately scrutinize 
Judge Thome's earlier determination. 
This Court is required to review the deed language de novo. The deed restrictions, 
coupled with the circumstances that existed at the time of the Ellison Woods Subdivi-
sion's development, demonstrate ambiguities as to the number of dwelling units that 
may be developed on a lot. The trial court failed to appropriately consider this issue, 
the language of the deeds is vague and ambiguous, and the jury should have determined, 
among the other issues presented to it, whether or not the deeds limit the number of 
dwelling units that can be built on a platted lot in the Subdivision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR OTHERWISE, THE 
COURT'S RULING RESPECTING AMBIGUITY WAS ERRONEOUS. 
The Appellees' Brief goes to great lengths in arguing that no summary judgment 
was entered in this case. The Brief also argues, however, that Judge Dever "clearly 
reconsidered Judge Thome's previous decision, and then he affirmed it." (Brief of 
Appellees at p. 15.) In the trial court, Appellees' counsel argued even more forcefully 
that Judge Thome's ruling respecting ambiguity was proper and could not be recon-
sidered. When the plaintiff sought to have Judge Dever reconsider this ruling during 
the trial, counsel for the defendants argued: 
Now, that's an order and the court has made that order and 
we've been relying on that order ever since. And the order of the 
court was that, as a matter of law, that (sic) these covenants were 
clear and unambiguous, and unenforceable on their face. (Tr. 172.) 
Clearly, this ruling was a ruling on a summary judgment. Even assuming the 
ruling was not on a summary judgment, the ruling had the same effect, as it was a ruling, 
as a matter of law, on the issue of ambiguity. No summary judgment motion requesting 
this ruling was brought, and thus the court erred in making the determination as to the am-
biguity of the deeds. Further, the court erred in so ruling because the court did not have 
before it evidence of all of the relevant circumstances, as is required by Utah case law. 
II. A PROPER REVIEW OF THE DEEDS REVEALS THEIR AMBIGUITY. 
A review of the deeds establishes that they were vague and ambiguous. At the trial 
in this matter, the court was presented with copies of the deeds and had the language to 
review. In addition, the court heard testimony of Elliott J. Wintch, an original purchaser 
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in the Subdivision, who testified that he purchased his property, consisting of lots 23 and 
24 of the platted Subdivision, by metes and bounds, from the developer, and that there-
after, four homes had been built on those two lots. (Tr. 317-338.) The court also had 
testimony of the defendants' own expert who considered the language of the deeds to be 
ambiguous. (Tr. 241.) 
Under Utah law, a court seeking to determine whether a contract is ambiguous, 
must consider "any relevant evidence . . . ." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). In Ward, the Utah Supreme Court considered various means of 
interpreting contracts and ultimately concluded that "rational interpretation requires at 
least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention 
of the parties . . . so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation in which the par-
ties found themselves at the time of contracting.'" 907 P.2d at 268, quoting from Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d at 645 (Cal. 1968) 
(internal reference omitted). Ward's requirement that the court consider extrinsic evi-
dence has been repeatedly followed by the Utah state and federal appellate courts. See, 
e.g., Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11,/P39, 
20 P.3d 287; Sanpete Water Conservancy Dist. v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist, 226 
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000).l 
1
 In the case of Little Caeser Enterprises, Inc. v. Bell Canyon Shopping Ctr., L.C., 
2000 UT App. 291, 13 P.3d 600, the appellants argued that Ward was implicitly over-
turned. The contention that Ward was implicitly overturned, however, is belied by the 
Utah Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of Ward in the Yeargin opinion. 
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In this case, the evidence respecting the division of lots 23 and 24 into four lots, 
and the continued existence of four dwelling units on those two platted lots, is evidence 
demonstrating the internal inconsistency of the deeds' language respecting "a dwelling 
house" and "dwelling houses." The deeds to lots 3 and 4 and the deeds to lots 23 and 24 
are virtually identical. This inconsistent interpretation of the deed language illustrates 
that the deeds are vague and ambiguous as to the number of dwelling units that may be 
constructed on a platted lot. If the deeds were not ambiguous, the defendants' counsel 
would not have been able to make his argument to the jury that the existence of four 
dwelling units on two lots "wasn't a violation at all." (Tr. 481.) The defendants' coun-
sel, by successfully closing the door for the jury's consideration of ambiguity, was able to 
rely upon the extrinsic evidence involving the division of lots 23 and 24 in order to argue 
that constructing four houses on lots 23 and 24 was simply a "mistake." There is no way, 
however, that the existence of four homes on two lots can be reconciled with an interpre-
tation of the deed that limits each platted lot in the Subdivision to "one dwelling unit." 
CONCLUSION 
It is uncontroverted that the proceedings in this case resulted in a ruling, made by 
Judge Thorne, determining that the deed restrictions were vague and ambiguous. That 
ruling was made even though neither party had moved for such a ruling. Judge Dever 
thereafter relied upon that ruling in refusing to allow the jury to consider the ambiguity 
of the covenants. The jury should have been allowed to consider the other relevant evi-
dence, as well as the language of the covenants, to determine if the covenants were am-
biguous. With that information, the jury could more properly have made the other deter-
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minations that they were asked to make respecting whether or not other circumstances in 
the Subdivision constituted violations of the covenants. 
DATED this 3— day of December, 2001. 
HOBBS, ADONDAKIS & OLSON, L.C. 
LIN^LN W. HOBBS 
ftKJKO KAWAMURA 
attorneys for Appellant Holladay Duplex 
Management Company, L.L.C. 
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